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Getty Images<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\nThe Grenfell Inquiry\u2019s final report sets out how a chain of failures across government and the private sector led to Grenfell Tower becoming a death trap.<\/p>\n The fire killed 72 people in 2017, with the cladding already found to be the \u201cprincipal\u201d reason for the blaze\u2019s rapid spread.<\/p>\n On Wednesday, the final 1,700-page report of the six-year public inquiry into the fire was published, setting out a \u201cpath to disaster\u201d stretching back to the early 1990s.<\/p>\n Here are the key points from the final report.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n The report by Sir Martin Moore-Bick, a retired High Court judge, says experts sounded an alarm about cladding fires in 1992 after the 11-storey Knowsley Heights tower caught alight in Huyton, Merseyside.<\/p>\n Seven years later there was another fire at Garnock Court in Irvine, North Ayrshire, and a committee of MPs repeated the concerns.<\/p>\n But the flammable cladding wasn\u2019t banned because it had already been classed as meeting a British safety standard.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n Safety tests in 2001 revealed the type of cladding of concern \u201cburned violently\u201d. The results were kept confidential and the government did not tighten any rules.<\/p>\n \u201cWe do not understand the failure to act in relation to a matter of such importance,\u201d the inquiry panel said.<\/p>\n Eight years later in 2009, six people died in a fire at Lakanal House, a high rise in South London. The coroner at their inquests asked for a review of building regulations but, the inquiry found, this was \u201cnot treated with any sense of urgency.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n In 2010 the coalition government headed by David Cameron was on a mission to cut regulations – which it had dubbed as \u201cred tape\u201d holding back British enterprise.<\/p>\n The inquiry found this policy so \u201cdominated\u201d thinking in government that \u201ceven matters affecting the safety of life were ignored, delayed or disregarded.\u201d<\/p>\n The inquiry found that the then housing department was \u201cpoorly run\u201d and fire safety had been left in the hands of a relatively junior official.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n The Building Research Establishment (BRE) is a key body in the UK that was set up 100 years ago to help deliver quality science-led standards for the construction industry. It is the government\u2019s expert adviser.<\/p>\n The BRE was privatised in 1997 – but the inquiry said it then became exposed it to \u201cunscrupulous product manufacturers.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n The inquiry found there had been \u201csystematic dishonesty\u201d from those who made and sold the cladding.<\/p>\n Arconic, a manufacturer, \u201cdeliberately concealed\u201d the true extent of the danger of the cladding used to wrap Grenfell Tower. Fire tests it commissioned showed the cladding performed poorly but this information was not given to the BBA, a British private certification company tasked with keeping the construction industry up to date.<\/p>\n This \u201ccaused BBA to make statements that Arconic knew were \u2018false and misleading\u2019\u201d, the report said.<\/p>\n Two firms made the insulation inside the cladding panels – Celotex and Kingspan.<\/p>\n Celotex made \u201cfalse and misleading claims\u201d about its product being suitable for Grenfell, said the inquiry. Kingspan, the inquiry said, misled the market by not revealing the limitations of its product.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n The inquiry said Grenfell\u2019s refit was poorly managed by contractors and the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea\u2019s company that ran social housing, known as a Tenant Management Organisation (TMO).<\/p>\n The inquiry said there had been a breakdown in trust and relations between the TMO and residents, which led to a \u201cserious failure to observe responsibilities\u201d.<\/p>\n It showed a \u201cpersistent indifference\u201d to fire safety and the needs of vulnerable residents.<\/p>\n When the TMO had to replace self-shutting fire doors in the block – a key safety measure to prevent spread of smoke and flames – it did not order the correct specification that would improve the chances of residents being rescued.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n The inquiry said that during the refit of the building there was a failure to establish who was responsible for safety standards – ultimately leading to a \u201cmerry go round of buck passing\u201d.<\/p>\n Studio E, the architect for the refurbishment, failed to recognise the cladding was combustible. The inquiry said it \u201cbears a very significant degree of responsibility for the disaster\u201d.<\/p>\n The cladding contractor Harley Facades \u201cbears significant responsibility\u201d because it had not concerned itself with fire safety at any stage.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n The LFB had known since the 2009 Lakanal fire that it faced challenges in fighting blazes in high-rise blocks. The firefighters who went into Grenfell had not been prepared for what they had to battle through to try to save lives.<\/p>\n The inquiry said senior officers had been complacent and lacked the skills to recognise the problems and correct them. There was a failure to share knowledge about cladding fires, a failure to plan for a large number of 999 calls, or train staff in what to tell trapped residents.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n The inquiry pulls no punches in concluding that the path to disaster began many years ago.<\/p>\n It says that the way building safety is managed in England and Wales is \u201cseriously defective\u201d. It recommends a single regulator, answerable to a government minister, so that officials and the industry can be held to account.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\nGovernment was warned 25 years before the disaster struck<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n
Fire tests proved how dangerous the cladding was<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n
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Grenfell Inquiry<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\nThe 2010 coalition government ignored risks<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n
Privatisation of a key body added to problems<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n
Dangers were ‘deliberately concealed’<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n
Council body showed ‘indifference’<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n
There was buck-passing among contractors<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n
London Fire Brigade bosses didn\u2019t prepare their teams<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n
And so the disaster was the product of ‘decades of failure’<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n